Interactive Game Theory Playground

These are quick, classroom-friendly games that illustrate classic incentives and coordination problems. Click Play to open each game in a new tab.

Cooperate or defect? Mutual cooperation beats mutual defection, but each player is tempted to defect for a short-term edge, leading to a worse outcome for both if they both defect.

Two drivers head toward each other. If both stay the course, they crash; if one swerves and the other doesn’t, the bold one “wins.” Both prefer avoiding the crash, but each hopes the other yields.

Two players want to coordinate but prefer different outcomes. Both would rather meet than miss each other, yet each hopes coordination happens on their preferred option.

Hunt Stag for a big payoff only if both commit, or Hunt Hare for a smaller, safe payoff no matter what. The high-payoff Stag outcome requires trust; Hare is safe but lower.

One player proposes how to split a fixed pot; the other accepts or rejects. Offers that seem “unfair” risk rejection—meaning both get zero.

Each round, Labor and Capital invest part of their wealth; a Cobb–Douglas production function creates output, and the sides split the results. Next round’s wealth depends on saving and the agreed split.